more from Colin McGinn

Single Idea 6171

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs]

Full Idea

We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions.

Gist of Idea

Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions

Source

Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6

Book Reference

Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.108


A Reaction

McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved.