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Single Idea 5743

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds]

Full Idea

It has proved difficult to justify possible worlds semantics without accepting possible worlds. Without a secure metaphysical underpinning, the results in logic are in danger of having nothing more than a formal significance.

Clarification

'Semantics' concerns meaning

Gist of Idea

If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal

Source

Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2)

Book Reference

Melia,Joseph: 'Modality' [Acumen 2003], p.62


A Reaction

This makes nicely clear why Lewis's controversial modal realism has to be taken seriously. It appears that the key problem is truth, because that is needed to define validity, but you can't have truth without some sort of metaphysics.