more from Alexander Miller

Single Idea 7306

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential]

Full Idea

If having a reference were the only semantic property in terms of which we could explain the functioning of names, we would be in trouble with respect to names that simply have no bearer.

Gist of Idea

If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names


Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 2.1.1)

Book Reference

Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.24

A Reaction

(Miller is discussing Frege) 'Odysseus' is given as an example. Instead of switching to a bundle of descriptions, we could say that we just imagine an object which is stamped with the name. Names always try to refer.