more from Alexander Miller

Single Idea 7325

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour]

Full Idea

Dispositional facts are facts about what we will do, not about what we ought to do, and as such cannot capture the normativity of meaning.


'Normativity' concerns creating and following rules

Gist of Idea

Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity


Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.2)

Book Reference

Miller,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Language' [UCL Press 1998], p.181

A Reaction

Miller is discussing language, but this raises a nice question for all behaviourist accounts of mental events. Perhaps there is a disposition to behave in a guilty way if you do something you think you shouldn't do. (Er, isn't 'guilt' a mental event?)