more from John L. Pollock

Single Idea 8817

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure]

Full Idea

Epistemologists have noted that logical entailments do not always constitute reasons. P may entail Q without the connection between P and Q being at all obvious.

Gist of Idea

Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant

Source

John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern')

Book Reference

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.204


A Reaction

Graham Priest and others try to develop 'relevance logic' to deal with this. This would deny the peculiar classical claim that everything is entailed by a falsehood. A belief looks promising if it entails lots of truths about the world.