more from John L. Pollock

Single Idea 8823

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations]

Full Idea

When one makes a perceptual judgement on the basis of a perceptual state, I want to say that the perceptual state itself is one's reason. ..Reason are always reasons for beliefs, but the reasons themselves need not be beliefs.

Gist of Idea

Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief

Source

John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Dir.Realism')

Book Reference

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.220


A Reaction

A crucial issue. I think I prefer the view of Davidson, in Ideas 8801 and 8804. Three options: a pure perception counts as a reason, or perceptions involve some conceptual content, or you only acquire a reason when a proposition is formulated.

Related Ideas

Idea 8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]

Idea 8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]