more from Hilary Putnam

Single Idea 11908

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind]

Full Idea

The only place for essentialism to come from in Putnam's semantic account is out of the 'same kind' relation. But if the same kind relation can be cashed out in terms that do not involve sharing properties (apart from 'being water') there is a gap.

Gist of Idea

Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties


comment on Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.4

Book Reference

Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.180

A Reaction

[This is the criticism of Salmon and Mellor] See Mackie's discussion for details. I would always have thought that relations result from essences, so could never be used to define them.