more from Willard Quine

Single Idea 19321

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated]

Full Idea

Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'.

Gist of Idea

We might do without names, by converting them into predicates

Source

report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6

Book Reference

Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.161


A Reaction

Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to.