more from Howard Robinson

Single Idea 6503

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind]

Full Idea

It is generally conceded by reductive physicalists that a state of the brain cannot be intrinsically about anything, for intentionality is not an intrinsic property of anything, so there can be no internal objects for a physicalist.

Gist of Idea

Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4)

Book Reference

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.136


A Reaction

Perhaps it is best to say that 'aboutness' is not a property of physics. We may say that a brain state 'represents' something, because the something caused the brain state, but representations have to be recognised