more from David-Hillel Ruben

Single Idea 17087

[catalogued under 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction]

Full Idea

The 'symmetry thesis' holds that there is only a pragmatic, or epistemic, but no logical, difference between explaining and predicting. …The only difference is in what the producer of the deduction knows just before the deduction is produced.

Gist of Idea

The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically

Source

David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 4)

Book Reference

Ruben,David-Hillel: 'Explaining Explanation' [Routledge 1990], p.124


A Reaction

He cites Mill has holding this view. It seems elementary to me that I can explain something but not predict it, or predict it but not explain it. The latter case is just Humean habitual induction.