Full Idea
Ryle objected somewhere to my dictum that 'to be is to be the value of a variable', arguing that the values of variables are expressions, and hence that my dictum repudiates all things except expressions.
Gist of Idea
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions
Source
report of Gilbert Ryle (works [1950]) by Willard Quine - Reply to Professor Marcus p.183
Book Reference
Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.183
A Reaction
I have a lot of sympathy with Ryle's view, and I associate it with the peculiar Millian view that we can somehow replace a name in a sentence with the actual physical object. Objects can't be parts of sentences - and maybe they can't be 'values'.