more from Gilbert Ryle

Single Idea 13985

[catalogued under 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts]

Full Idea

Whereas there might be just one fact that a true proposition was like, we would have to say that a false proposition was unlike any fact. We could not speak of the fact that it was false of, so we could not speak of its being false of anything at all.

Gist of Idea

A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all.

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections')

Book Reference

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.27


A Reaction

Ryle brings out very nicely the point Russell emphasised so much, that the most illuminating studies in philosophy are of how falsehood works, rather than of how truths work. If I say 'the Queen is really a man' it is obvious what that is false of.