more from John Searle

Single Idea 3825

[catalogued under 16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents]

Full Idea

It is a formal requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in a way that it is not a formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives.

Gist of Idea

Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't

Source

John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX)

Book Reference

Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.93


A Reaction

I don't find this persuasive. I don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility of a set of desires and reasons within an organism which generate an action, without any intervening 'self' to add something. Ockham's Razor.