more from Sextus Empiricus

Single Idea 22754

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good]

Full Idea

Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property.

Gist of Idea

Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it

Source

Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35)

Book Reference

Sextus Empiricus: 'Against the Physicists/Against the Ethicists', ed/tr. Bury,R.G. [Harvard Loeb 1997], p.403


A Reaction

This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use.

Related Idea

Idea 11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]