more from Sydney Shoemaker

Single Idea 15099

[catalogued under 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity]

Full Idea

If it is possible that there could be possible states of affairs that are not nomologically possible, don't we therefore need a notion of metaphysical possibility that outruns nomological possibility?

Gist of Idea

If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility


Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI)

Book Reference

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.423

A Reaction

Shoemaker rejects this possibility (p.425). I sympathise. So there is 'natural' possibility (my preferred term), which is anything which stuff, if it exists, could do, and 'logical' possibility, which is anything that doesn't lead to contradiction.

Related Idea

Idea 16276 Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]