more from Ernest Sosa

Single Idea 8797

[catalogued under 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence]

Full Idea

If I have a headache, I could have a set of beliefs that I do not have a headache, that I am not in pain, that no one is in pain, and so on. The resulting system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs.

Gist of Idea

The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent

Source

Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §9)

Book Reference

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.145


A Reaction

I think this is a misunderstanding of coherentism. Beliefs are not to be formulated through a process of coherence, but are evaluated that way. A belief that I have headache just arrives; I then see that its denial is incoherent, so I accept it.