more from Rowland Stout

Single Idea 20038

[catalogued under 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism]

Full Idea

If volitionism identifies the action with an act of will, this has the unpalatable consequence (for a Cartesian dualist) that walking does not happen in the material world. It would be the same act of walking if you had no legs, or no body at all.

Gist of Idea

If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant


Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Volitionism')

Book Reference

Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.9

A Reaction

Is this attacking a caricature version of volitionism? Descartes would hardly subscribe to the view that no legs are needed for walking. If my legs spasmodically move without an act of will, we typically deny that this is an action.

Related Idea

Idea 20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]