Full Idea
An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'.
Gist of Idea
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
Source
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
Book Reference
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.10
A Reaction
[attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me.
Related Idea
Idea 20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]