more from John Wycliff

Single Idea 16701

[catalogued under 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things]

Full Idea

If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.

Gist of Idea

To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant


John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3

Book Reference

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.389

A Reaction

An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.