more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 11076

[catalogued under 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics]

Full Idea

If we take account of the fact that a speaker is in a community, then we must adopt an assertability-conditions semantics (based on what is legitimately assertible), and reject truth-conditional semantics (based on correspondence to the facts).

Gist of Idea

Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics


report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1

Book Reference

Hanna,Robert: 'Rationality and Logic' [MIT 2006], p.163

A Reaction

[Part of Hanna's full summary of Kripke's argument] This sounds wrong to me. There are conditions where it is agreed that a lie should be told. Two people can be guilty of the same malapropism.