more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 11880

[catalogued under 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity]

Full Idea

Kripke claims that all of his examples of the necessary a posteriori have the characteristic that we can know a priori that if they are true, they are necessarily true.

Gist of Idea

Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary


report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], 159) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.4

Book Reference

Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.9

A Reaction

That is, it seems, that they are not really necessary a posteriori! The necessity seems to only arrive with the addition of a priori judgements, thus endorsing the traditional view that necessity is only derivable a priori. Hm.