more from Michael Jubien

Single Idea 13388

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind]

Full Idea

It is simply far-fetched - even incoherent - to think that, given an entity, of whatever kind, its being a single entity somehow consists in its satisfying some condition involving the kind to which it belongs (or concepts related to that kind).

Gist of Idea

It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence


Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 2.3)

Book Reference

Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.47

A Reaction

Well said. I can't see how philosophers have allowed themselves to drift into such a daft view. Kinds blatantly depend on the individuals that constitute them, so how could the identity of the individuals depend on their kind?