more from Michael Jubien

Single Idea 13390

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds]

Full Idea

The fundamental problem is that in world theory, what passes for necessity is in effect just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'.

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies


Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2)

Book Reference

Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.75

A Reaction

Jubien's general complaint is that there is no connection between the possible worlds and the actual world, so they are irrelevant, but this is a nicely different point - that lots of contingent worlds can't add up to necessity. Nice.