more from Dorothy Edgington

Single Idea 13859

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals]

Full Idea

X believes that if A, B, to the extent that he judges that A & B is nearly as likely as A, or (roughly equivalently) to the extent that he judges A & B to be more likely than A & ČB.

Gist of Idea

X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ČB


Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 5)

Book Reference

'A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic', ed/tr. Hughes,R.I.G. [Hackett 1993], p.38

A Reaction

This is a formal statement of her theory of conditionals.