more from Nathan Salmon

Single Idea 14675

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds]

Full Idea

As far as I can tell, worlds need not be logically consistent. The only restriction on worlds is that they must be (in some sense) 'maximal' ways for things to be.

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent


Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I)

Book Reference

Salmon,Nathan: 'Metaphysics, Mathematics and Meaning' [OUP 2005], p.132

A Reaction

The normal idea of a maximal model is that it must contain either p or p, and not both, so I don't think I understand this thought, but I pass it on.