more from Nathan Salmon

Single Idea 14682

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds]

Full Idea

Every argument I am aware of against impossible worlds confuses ways for things to be with ways things might have been, or worse, confuses ways things cannot be with ways for things to be that cannot exist - or worse yet, commits both errors.

Gist of Idea

Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions


Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III)

Book Reference

Salmon,Nathan: 'Metaphysics, Mathematics and Meaning' [OUP 2005], p.138

A Reaction

He is claiming that 'ways for things to be' allows impossible worlds, whereas 'ways things might have been' appears not to. (I think! Read the paragraph yourself!)

Related Idea

Idea 14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]