more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 16394

[catalogued under 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference]

Full Idea

One might think that the direction of Kripke's arguments goes the other way - that conclusions about reference and proper names were derived in part from controversial metaphysical assumptions about possible worlds and essential properties.

Gist of Idea

Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences


comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Reference and Necessity Intro

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.165

A Reaction

Nathan Salmon is famous for charging Kripke with trying to get a metaphysics from a semantics, but this remark of Stalnaker's seems much more accurate. Kripke certainly assumes realism, and robust identity.

Related Ideas

Idea 16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]

Idea 16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]