more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 16984

[catalogued under 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity]

Full Idea

I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc.

Gist of Idea

I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.19

A Reaction

I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences.