more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 16997

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties]

Full Idea

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

Gist of Idea

An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.48

A Reaction

This seems to equate essence with necessary properties, which is the view attacked nicely be Fine in 1994. I take essence (in Aristotle's sense) to be quite different from necessary properties (in being non-trivial, for example).