more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 17032

[catalogued under 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description]

Full Idea

If a Gödelian fraud were exposed, Gödel would no longer be called 'the author of the incompleteness theorem', but he would still be called 'Gödel'. The description, therefore, does not abbreviate the name.

Gist of Idea

Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 37)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.87

A Reaction

Clearly we can't make the description a necessary fact about Gödel, but that doesn't invalidate the idea that successful reference needs some description. E.g. Gödel is a person.

Related Idea

Idea 17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]