more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 3228

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument]

Full Idea

Kripke's argument against mind-brain identity is that a pain is necessarily pain (just as a stone is necessarily matter), but a brain state is not necessarily painful (just as a stone is not necessarily a doorstep).

Gist of Idea

Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful


report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.6.2

Book Reference

Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.308

A Reaction

As with Descartes' argument from necessity for dualism, this seems to me to beg the question. It seems to me fairly self-evident that certain brain states have to be painful, just as stones always have to be hard or massive.