more from Daniel Dennett

Single Idea 4878

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

I think there are only two good reasons why, when you make a mind, the materials matter: speed, and the ubiquity of transducers and effectors throughout the nervous system.

Clarification

These will add and change information

Gist of Idea

The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors

Source

Daniel Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.3)

Book Reference

Dennett,Daniel: 'Kinds of Minds' [Phoenix 1997], p.100


A Reaction

This sounds roughly right, because it gives you something between multiple realisability (minds made of cans and string), and type-type identity (minds ARE a particular material). Call it 'biological functionalism'?