more from John Perry

Single Idea 4892

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state.


'Martians' are assumed to constructed in a different physical way from ourselves

Gist of Idea

If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours


John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], 4.3)

Book Reference

Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.88

A Reaction

We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too.