more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 4950

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds]

Full Idea

The apparatus of possible worlds has (I hope) been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of quantified modal logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures.


'Modal logic' involves possibility and necessity

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 15)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.48

A Reaction

This is presumably a swipe at David Lewis, who claims possible worlds are real. The fact that the originator of possible worlds sees them as unproblematic doesn't mean they are. Fine if they are a game, but if they assert truth, they need a metaphysics.