more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 4951

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive]

Full Idea

I deny that a particular is nothing but a 'bundle of qualities', whatever that may mean. If a quality is an abstract object, a bundle of qualities is an object of an even higher degree of abstraction, not a particular.


A 'particular' is an actual item in the world

Gist of Idea

A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.52

A Reaction

Supports the 'baptism' view of reference, rather than Searle's bundle of descriptions. It shows that theories of reference must tie in with theories of universals, and that Searle is a nominalist. Is Kripke trying to duck metaphysical responsibility?