more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 4953

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation]

Full Idea

We do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with objects, which we have, and can identify, in the real world.

Gist of Idea

We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.53

A Reaction

This gives us clearly Kripke's underlying empiricist metaphysics, I take it. I find the realism of it appealing, but am uneasy about the idea of an object as basic, when Heraclitus said that they tend to fluctuate. Platonism waits in the wings.