more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 4968

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument]

Full Idea

The identity theorist is committed to the view that there could not be a C-fibre stimulation which was not a pain, nor a pain which was not a C-fibre stimulation; these consequences are certainly surprising and counterintuitive.


'C-fibres' were thought to be the physical location of pain

Gist of Idea

Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong


Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)

Book Reference

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.149

A Reaction

If Kripke saw a glow in an area of his brain every time he felt a pain, he would cease to find it 'counterintuitive'. Far from this conclusion being 'surprising', its opposite is absurd. Pain with no brain event? C-fibres blaze away, and I feel nothing?