more from Paul Horwich

Single Idea 6342

[catalogued under 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth]

Full Idea

One correspondence theory (e.g. early Wittgenstein) concerns representations and facts; alternatively (Tarski, Davidson) the category of fact is eschewed, and the truth of sentences or propositions is built out of relations of reference and satisfaction.

Gist of Idea

Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction

Source

Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.7.35)

Book Reference

Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.104


A Reaction

A helpful distinction. Clearly the notion of a 'fact' is an elusive one ("how many facts are there in this room?"), so it seems quite promising to say that the parts of the sentence correspond, rather than the whole thing.