more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 7430

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind]

Full Idea

In his attempted disproof of materialism about the mind, Kripke assumes that the physical description is a rigid designator, but this seems to be begging the question against the causal theory, which says the description is non-rigid.


Rigid designators refer to an item in all possible worlds

Gist of Idea

Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't


comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xiv

Book Reference

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-10

A Reaction

A crucial part of this is that Armstrong believes that the laws of nature are contingent, and hence mind-brain identity has to be. Personally I incline to say that the identity is rigid, but that Kripke is still wrong.