more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 7867

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument]

Full Idea

Kripke's argument is that the possibility of conscious properties coming apart from material properties shows that they cannot be identical with material properties.

Gist of Idea

If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain


report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 3.3

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.79

A Reaction

A nice clear and simple summary. How can the possibility of coming apart be demonstrated? Only, it seems, by using our imaginations. But that is quite a good guide in areas we know well, but not in recondite areas like the brain.