more from Penelope Maddy

Single Idea 8755

[catalogued under 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets]

Full Idea

Maddy dispenses with pure sets, by sketching a strong set theory in which everything is either a physical object or a set of sets of ...physical objects. Eventually a physiological story of perception will extend to sets of physical objects.

Gist of Idea

Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects


report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3

Book Reference

Shapiro,Stewart: 'Thinking About Mathematics' [OUP 2000], p.223

A Reaction

This doesn't seem to find many supporters, but if we accept the perception of resemblances as innate (as in Hume and Quine), it is isn't adding much to see that we intrinsically see things in groups.