more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 8957

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential]

Full Idea

Kripke explicitly allows for the introduction of names through initial reference-fixing via descriptions. Versions of the causal theory of reference that disallow this would have a difficult time explaining how the name 'Neptune' came to refer.


Neptune was predicted before it was discovered

Gist of Idea

Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism


report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 4.2 n35

Book Reference

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.30

A Reaction

The initial reference to Neptune has to be by description, but you could still give a baptismal account once it is discovered. The direct contact now takes precedence. Suppose another similar planet was found nearby...