more from Saul A. Kripke

Single Idea 9176

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts]

Full Idea

Statements about the modal properties of this table never refer to counterparts. However, if someone confuses the epistemological problems and the metaphysical problems he will be well on the way to the counterpart theory of Lewis.

Gist of Idea

Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics


Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.184 n16)

Book Reference

'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.184

A Reaction

I can't make out what we should say about a possible object which is very nearly this table. Kripke needs the table to have a clear and unwavering essence, but tables are not that sort of thing. How would Kripke define 'physical object'?