more from Volker Halbach

Single Idea 15652

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic]

Full Idea

The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions.

Gist of Idea

We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties


Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.3

A Reaction

I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science.