more from Volker Halbach

Single Idea 16297

[catalogued under 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth]

Full Idea

In semantic theories (e.g.Tarski's or Kripke's), a definition evades Tarski's Theorem by restricting the possible instances in the schema T[φ]↔φ to sentences of a proper sublanguage of the language formulating the equivalences.

Gist of Idea

Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage


Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1)

Book Reference

Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.6

A Reaction

The schema says if it's true it's affirmable, and if it's affirmable it's true. The Liar Paradox is a key reason for imposing this restriction.

Related Idea

Idea 16295 Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]