more from Volker Halbach

Single Idea 16346

[catalogued under 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity]

Full Idea

Should necessity be treated as a predicate rather than (as in modal logic) as a sentential operator? It is odd to assign different status to necessity and truth, hampering their interaction. That all necessities are true can't be expressed by an operator.

Gist of Idea

Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth


Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 24.2)

Book Reference

Halbach,Volker: 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' [CUP 2011], p.340

A Reaction

[compressed] Halbach and Horsten consistently treat truth as a predicate, but maybe truth is an operator. Making necessity a predicate and not an operator would be a huge upheaval in the world of modal logic. Nice move!