more from George Bealer

Single Idea 9452

[catalogued under 19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions]

Full Idea

The reductionist view of propositions sees them as either extensional functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as ordered sets of properties, relations, and perhaps particulars.

Gist of Idea

Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations

Source

George Bealer (Propositions [1998], 1)

Book Reference

'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.121


A Reaction

The usual problem of all functional accounts is 'what is it about x that enables it to have that function?' And if they are sets, where does the ordering come in? A proposition isn't just a list of items in some particular order. Both wrong.