Ideas from 'The Justification of Deduction' by Michael Dummett [1973], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth and Other Enigmas' by Dummett,Michael [Duckworth 1978,0-7156-1650-1]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19066
|
Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science
|
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
19067
|
A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step
|
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
19060
|
Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11066
|
Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Hanna]
|
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
19058
|
Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples
|
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
19063
|
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established
|
19059
|
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1
|
19062
|
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions
|
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
19065
|
Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
19061
|
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
19064
|
Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible
|