Ideas from 'LOT 2' by Jerry A. Fodor [2008], by Theme Structure
[found in 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' by Fodor,Jerry A. [OUP 2008,978-0-19-954877-4]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
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12644
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Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
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12633
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Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
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12664
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A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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12648
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Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind
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12650
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'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
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12656
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P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
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Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone'
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
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12628
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Knowing that must come before knowing how
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
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12625
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Pragmatism is the worst idea ever
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
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12636
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Mental states have causal powers
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
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12661
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The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
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12632
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In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
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12624
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Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
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Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts
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12640
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Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
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12643
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Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
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We think in file names
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12647
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Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
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12655
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Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them?
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
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12630
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If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
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12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
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12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
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12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
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12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
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12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
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12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
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12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product)
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
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12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference
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12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
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12657
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Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
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12634
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'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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12642
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Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers
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12663
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We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
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12645
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Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
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12646
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Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
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12627
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Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success
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