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12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken |